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 I.  Introduction 
  
The present day political conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 
such as  in Israel and Palestine and in Iraq, obscure  numerous other critical conflicts that 
face other  countries in the area.  This study addresses general issues relating to both 
political conflict and common resource use conflict and examines potential predictable 
outcomes.  The political issues with contestable resources and the environment are 
plentiful, and some have been the subject of many studies (see for example, Lofgren, 
2003).  In situations where information is opaque,  where externalities obscure signalling 
and  where  there are many accounted (and unaccounted)  players,  conflicts do not get 
resolved and there are many tragedies  of common resources  or  prisoner's dilemmas. 
 
This paper examines the general cases of political conflicts,  common resource conflicts 
and possible coordination efforts.  The next part discusses political conflicts and 
strategies; the third  part examines resource use conflicts.  Then specific cases in the 
MENA region are discussed.   Last part gives conclusions. 
 
II. Political Conflicts and Strategies 
 
Add lit survey 
 
What are the pure and mixed strategies in conflicts?   Suppose two countries A and B  of 
equal size and strength simultaneously threaten each other with war, and each party 
possesses imperfect information on the behaviour of its adversary.  Further suppose the 
only options available to each side are either war or a serious concessions to the other 
party to avoid war. When  both parties jointly opt for peace (i.e. ,  avoid war), let the 
payoffs be zero for both.  Define the payoff (or costs of) of war as an aggregate  value  of 
–W [negative W]. Also suppose that the first country that backs down from war and 
offers a peace concession faces a payoff of value –C (or gives up C) where C is non-
zero2.  This becomes the other country’s gain.3
 
 Also, note that: 
C ≤ W         [1] 
 
Where the ‘concession price’ for peace is less than the costs of war. 
 
Given imperfect information,  expected value of war or  expected value of concessions 
(that is, backing down first to accept peace) is conditional on the behaviour of the other 
country.  Let P stand for probability, then the expected values (EV) of each strategy (of 
war and peace)  for Country A are:  
 
EVA(War) = PB(War)(-W) + PB
                                                        
2 Concession costs could be generated by numerous sources.  Concessions might include  land, people, 
trade rights, fiscal revenue, natural resources and  real and nominal subsidies.  There may  also be cultural 
and  institutional  concessions.   
(Peace)(+ C)  [2] 
3 For a one period game, we do not consider the present value of future benefits.  Note that due to costs of 
war, the game constructed is a variable sum, not a zero sum  game. 
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where Country A gains the value C if Country B makes the first peace concession and 
 
EVA(Peace) = PB(War) (-C) + PB
 
(Peace)(0)  [3] 
if Country A makes the first peace concession. 
 
With a jointly negotiated peace, the payoffs are zero for each party. In most situations, 
threats and the escalation to war are more realistic than a jointly and immediately 
negotiated peace between countries in conflict.   
 
There are two pure strategy Nash Equilibriums to this game in which either Country A or 
Country B go to war as the other side gives concessions.  Both these equilibriums result 
in losses for one of the parties  and  are not desirable from the point of peace and social 
welfare. The payoffs in equilibrium are asymmetric. 
 
Is there no hope for peace?  Thee is another outcome to this game if each party  gets the 
same payoff in equilibrium, that is a third Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies that 
rewards each country the same payoff.  Since one of the fundamental conditions is the 
criterion that each pure strategy pays the same for each country under imperfect 
information, and since the only options are war or peace (hence the probabilities sum to 
each other), we can get this equilibrium by setting  [2] and [3] equal to each other  and by 
substituting for the peace term: 
 
PB(War)(-W+C) + (1- PB
 
(War))( C) = 0  [4] 
 
Solving for probability of war, we get, 
 
PB
 
(War)= C/W      [5a] 
and  therefore 
 
PB
 
(Peace)= 1 -  (C/W)     [5b] 
Both 5a and 5b are important.   They show that the ratios of costs of war and costs of 
backing down (or offering the first concessions for peace) are crucial in determining the 
probabilities of strategies for two countries which  find themselves in these situations.  
Note that if the costs of concessions  are relatively high (C is close to the value of W), 
there is a greater probability that the parties will choose war.  Since cost structures are 
symmetric between two parties in this version, the probabilities of going to war will be 
the same for both countries.   
 
When the C/W ratios are equal between parties, the region will actually experience war 
when both parties decide on war simultaneously, with a joint probability of:  
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P(War)=  (C/W)2
 
       [6] 
and will have peace with a probability of (1- (C/W)2
 
).  This case illustrates the 
importance of cost proportionality when negotiating for peace, even when the cost 
structures are symmetric for each country in question (i.e., neither country has a cost 
advantage). 
If we relax this assumption and accept that countries are of unequal strength, such that the 
costs of war (proportional to their GDP, for instance) are different and smaller for one 
party, then the ‘war-efficient’ country may exhibit more aggression than the higher-cost 
country4
 
.   
 
 
 This game will result in mixed strategy for the simplified world described above, 
where each country will choose war C/W percent of the time, and will withdraw from 
conflict situations (1 – C/W) percent of the time.   
 
NEIGHBORS AND THIRD PARTIES CAN CHANGE OUTCOMES 
 
What about neutral neighbours?  This neutrality may be a tautology, in that in 
cases of political conflict, no bordering neighbour remains unaffected.  Flow of refugees,  
increase  in the illegal informal workers  (for example, the labor markets in Iran near the 
Afgan border), spread of social  unrest, disruption of trade flows will affect many 
neighbours whose best interests lie in the resolution of such conflicts. In most cases, UN 
is called in as a third neutral party to stop and control conflict in contested areas.   
 
Since the cost of war to cost of concessions is crucial to the  conflict resolution in 
the region, other neighbours or  UN who are neutral parties to the conflict can assist, 
either by making war very costly, (for example, by placing economic sanctions on the 
aggressor country), or by making concession strategies cheaper such as aiding the non-
aggressor country.   
                                                        
4  Suppose  war costs for country A are smaller than the war costs for country B.  That is, 
 
WA  < WB;          [7] 
 
where   
 
C ≤  WA,  
 
And we assume that costs of concessions are symmetric between the two parties.  Again, the two pure Nash 
Equilibriums show conflict as long as both war costs are more than peace concessions.  If we again equate 
payoffs, the probabilities of each strategy for each country will be dependent  on the adversary’s cost of 
war.  That is, the war threat of the other country becomes credible or empty, depending on their relative 
cost structures.   
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Equation 6 above reinforces the fact that neighbours who have a mutual  benefit  
in keeping peace in the region have large vested interests in reducing the probability of 
war,  and therefore  they should  strive to make war more costly for the conflicting 
parties5
 
. 
This analysis can be extended to repeated games and first-mover games, and the basic 
principles remain the same.  For the third mixed strategy equilibrium,  cost of concession 
relative to the cost of war remains an integral part of conflict resolution.  In first mover 
games, signalling with war or concessions can trigger different strategies for the other 
party whose best-response functions depend on observing the first-mover.  In repeated 
games,  costs of war or the size of the concessions may change over time, depending on 
the memory built into the system.  In repeated games, one must also figure the present 
value of  future credibility, since signals will  eventually establish reputation.  For parties 
with lower costs of war, high concessions costs will be advantageous in the sense of 
signalling the others that the probability of war is  high.  This will  lead to the adversaries 
giving concessions  and  can  resolve the conflict.  
 
ARE ALL NEIGHBORS NEUTRAL?  SOME MAY BENEFIT FROM CONFLICT.  
 
 
When some neighbors actually benefit from the conflicts of  Countries A and B and 
actually promote conflicts,   games then become more complex due to more game players 
(even if  they are spoilers), externalities and due to extra  hidden cost and benefit 
functions.   
 
 In MENA,  there are several countries who border Iraq who actually benefit  
from the  war.  Some assume the mantel of perpetual peace keepers in the region and get 
increased foreign transfers from various sources which helps  their GDP growth.  Some 
benefit from the increased trade and services purchased for the war effort.  Some keep 
internal political stability and lackluster growth  in the back burner by focusing internal 
media on Iraq war.  Some of these neighbors who border Iraq have a vested interest in 
having the present political conflicts continue.   
In such cases,  transfer payments have to stop and neutral third parties have to 
expose these  neighbors (who benefit from the continuation of conflicts) and  also have to 
increase their costs of  subversive conflict-promotions.  
 
III. Is Peace Achievable?  Actual War Costs 
 
What exactly are the costs of war and how does one make it more costly for a country to 
go into war?  While this is a specific area of research in itself, one can use proxies to 
figure out the relative costs of war for different countries in the ME area. Threats of trade 
boycotts are one way of making conflict costs high.  Another proxy is to assess the 
defence stock of a country.   Suppose we make a simple assumption that a larger standing 
                                                        
5   This is when these neutral third parties and neighbors have no vested interest in the conflict and would 
like to see peace and stability in the region.    
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army and a larger defence budget imply smaller costs of going into war (in other words, a 
credible threat).  Table 1 gives an assessment of the size of defence spending in ME, the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea (for purposes of comparison, France and the USA are 
also included in the table). 
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Table 1; 1990, 2000, and 2003 Military Expenditures of some countries in MENA, 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea 
Country  
1990  
% 
GDP 
2000 
% 
GPD 
2000 
Military 
Expenditure 
in 
USD (in 
billions) 
2000 Military 
Expenditure 
per capita, 
USD 
2000 
Military 
Expenditure 
per 
kilometre 
sq, USD 
2003 
%  
GPD 
2003 
military  
expenditure 
in  
USD (in 
billions) 
2003 
military  
expenditure  
per capita 
USD 
2003 
military  
expenditure 
per  
kilometre 
sq, USD 
Saudi 
Arabia 12.8 11.6 20.1 990 10,253 8.7 18.68 829.28 9528.1 
Turkey  3.5 4.9 9.79 147 12,549 4.9 11.78 166.55 15099.31 
Israel  12.2 8 8.83 1,472 425,229 3.8 4.19 626.28 201663.5 
Greece  4.7 4.9 5.52 521 41,818 4.1 7.06 639.93 53486.13 
Iran  2.7 3.8 3.98 57 2,418 3.8 5.21 78.51 3165.15 
Kuwait  48.5 8.2 3.1 1,631 173,939 9 3.75 1567.89 210578.41 
Egypt  3.5 2.3 2.27 33 2,269 2.6 2.14 31.72 2141.46 
Algeria  1.5 3.5 1.86 62 783 3.3 2.19 68.97 923.81 
Oman  18.3 9.7 1.45 582 6,848 12.2               na               na               na 
Morocco  4.1 4.2 1.39 47 1,963 4.2 1.84 60.98 2592.01 
Ukraine      na 3.6 1.14 23 1,896 2.9 1.44 29.7 2387.46 
Syria  6.9 5.5 0.93 58 5,049 7.1 1.53 87.83 8287.42 
Jordan  11.1 9.5 0.78 161 8,838 8.9 0.88 165.36 9983.54 
Romania  3.5 2.1 0.77 34 3,246 2.4 1.37 62.86 5766.92 
Lebanon  5 3.6 0.59 170 57,115 4.3 0.82 181.63 79089.75 
Bulgaria  4.2 3 0.36 46 3,246 2.6 0.52 66.01 4665.22 
Tunisia  2 1.7 0.33 35 2,026 1.6 0.4 40.48 2455.76 
Bahrain  5.1 4 0.32 533                na 5.1               na               na               na 
Cyprus  5 3.2 0.27 309 30,097 1.5 0.17 221.79 19061.43 
Yemen  1 1.3 0.11 6 209 7.1 0.77 40.12 1456.92 
U.A.E.      na     3.1    
Qatar      na         na    
Libya      na     2    
           
           
USA  5.3 3.1 304.95 1076.83 33,269 3.8 417.41 1430.62 45538.11 
France  5.5 6 77.65 1311.69 141,952 2.6 45.7 764.66 83539.8 
           
 
 
Source: First two columns are from the Human Development Report, 2002, pp. 207-210, 
UNDP.  Third and fourth columns are calculated from same source, pp. 190-192. Sixth 
column is from Human Development Report 2005, UNDP. Seventh and eighth columns 
are calculated from the same source. 
 
 
Based on the numbers in this table, the size of total spending is largest in Saudi Arabia, 
which is then followed by Turkey, Israel, Iran and Kuwait.  In terms of military spending 
per capita (given in the fourth column), biggest spenders are Kuwait, Israel, S. Arabia, 
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Greece, Oman and S. Cyprus.  The usual caveats apply here on the reliability of reported 
statistics, however, the table above gives a ranking of credible threats in the area.  In 
terms of spending per kilometre squared, the largest spenders come up to be Israel, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Greece and Cyprus. 
 
The values on this table are very imperfect proxies.  The total amount of capital spending 
and the productivity of armies are not equal among nations.  Military experts will actually 
count the numbers of capital defence goods (battle-ready planes, tanks, etc) of an enemy 
when planning potential engagements because it provides a better proxy of strength and 
efficiency.  Also, some or all of this defence spending may be geared towards internal 
rather than external security issues.  Number of neighbours, number of adversaries, and  
internal strife vary between countries.  Unfortunately, no data were found on the 
partitioning of these expenditures between  internal and external defence. 
 
There are also issues where a guarantee of security can also make wars very costly to 
other parties.  Guarantees of security, as given to Japan and Germany by the USA after 
the 2nd
 
 World War, or guarantees by NATO or EU  for member states make the wars very 
costly for non-member states.  All these factors act as deterrents for war. 
Examining guerrilla warfare against standing armies can be another interesting 
application of game theory.  The costs of guerrilla warfare,  though enormous in a micro 
sense by individuals and their families (emotionally and otherwise) are actually much 
cheaper than wars engaged by standing armies. That is why we will see many more 
‘cheap wars’ in emerging conflict areas.  Simpson (1991) shows that a party (firm)  with 
lower costs will always behaviour aggressively in a repeated Cournot game, while the 
higher cost party will play a  mixed strategy.  There are have numerous cases of mixed 
strategies playing out between guerrilla and conventional armies in the MENA region, as 
conventional  armies often react differently to similar guerrilla attacks.   
 
Wars are costly and one should not forget about the dynamic nature of the costs of war.  
While we have used proxies to estimate the costs of war, we have not been able to find 
any data on the actual costs of war for MENA region.  For other regions, a 1995 estimate 
of the Peru/Ecuador  border conflict  is estimated to have cost 1% of Peruvian and 3 % of 
Ecuadorian GDP  (Ryser, 1995).  Milan (2001) cites that in 1993, Eritrea’s GDP was 
growing at a rate of 7 %.  With the conflict with Ethiopia, Eritrea’s army has since then 
doubled in size, its inflation rate is now 20% and exports have declined to 1/5 their 
former value.     
 
War costs also differ over time. Data are available for various wars engaged by the USA.   
Table 2   presents the per capita costs of war for the USA. 
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Table 2:  Comparable Costs of Wars per Capita for the USA 
United States 
Per Capita Cost of War in 1990 Dollars 
Revolutionary War $343 
War of 1812 $92 
Mexican War 
Civil War 
Spanish-American War 
World War I 
World War II 
Korean War 
Vietnam War 
Gulf War I 
$52 
$1,294 
$84 
$1,911 
$15,655 
$1,740 
$1,692 
$27 
Source: United States Civil War Center, Louisiana State University 
 
The data are adjusted for constant 1990 dollars and are comparable over time.  The 
enormous costs of  World War II, in comparison with other conflicts, are understandable  
given that the war was fought in many fronts,  and capital requirements for the Allied 
cause were borne mostly by the USA.  The large variability of costs per person over time 
for the USA underlines the importance of treating war costs and concession costs as 
dynamic problems. 
 
 
III. Conclusions 
 
This study is written under the premise and hope that the MENA region resolves the 
present day political conflicts while preserving the resources and the environment for the 
future generations.  Games of brinkmanship discussed in the paper point out to the fact 
that to resolve conflicts, neutral neighbors have to decrease costs of concessions and/or 
increase costs of war to adversaries,   
 
In the  case of political conflicts, such neighborly pressure has been missing or haphazard 
since there is no organization under which collective and mutual action can be taken.   
Most of the work in this area is done by internal or external non governmental 
organizations which may not have enough clout to make political change.  More 
important is the presence of neighbors who actually benefit from the conflict in the 
neighboring states.  This implies that political conflicts in the region in the future are still 
to be expected as predicted equilibriums.   
 
In the  case of resource conflicts, there is more hope since  the countries in the last decade 
have realized the serious nature of the problem.  One can hope for more mutually agreed 
upon conventions to help sustain renewable resources. 
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